The State of Utah v. Marvin Whittenback And John Joseph Parrett : Appellant\u27s Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
The State of Utah v. Marvin Whittenback And John
Joseph Parrett : Appellant's Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.ROBERT J. SCHUMACHER and LYNN C. HARRIS;
Attorneys for AppellantsROBERT B. HANSEN; Attorney for Respondent
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Whittenback, No. 16575 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1841
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MARVIN WHITTENBACK and 
JOHN JOSEPH PARRETT, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 16575 and 16738 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Utah State Attorney General 
236 State Capitol . 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
ROBERT J. SCHUMACHER and. 
LYNN C. HARRIS 
Utah County Legal Defender Assoc. 
107 East 100 South, Room 29 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellants 
F ~ l ED 
JUL 311980 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MARVIN WHITTENBACK and 
JOHN JOSEPH PARRETT, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 16575 and 16738 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
HONORABLE GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE-
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Utah State Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
ROBERT J. SCHUMACHER and 
LYNN C. HARRIS 
Utah County Legal Defender Assoc. 
107 East 100 South, Room 29 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT: 
I. 
II. 
III. 
THE INITIAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN APPELLANTS 
AND POLICE WAS A SEIZURE AND THEREFORE 
DESERVING OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
REQUIRING APPELLANTS TO EMPTY THEIR POCKETS 
IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER TERRY AND WAS NOT 
A SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST . . . . 
THE SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE WAS A 
VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS . . . . . . . . 
CASES CITED: 
1 
2 
6 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 43 (1970) 7 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) 7 
Harless v. Turner, 456 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1972) 8 
Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257 (1960) . . 7 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) 6 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) 4 
Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 389 (1968) 6 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 1, I 
U.S. v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974) 8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
vs. 
MARVIN WHITTENBACK and 
JOHN JOSEPH PARRETT, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 16575 
and 16738 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
I. THE INITIAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN APPELLANTS AND 
POLICE WAS A SEIZURE AND THEREFORE DESERVING 
OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
The Respondent asserts that the initial encounter 
and questioning by the police did not rise to the level 
of a seizure and was not therefore worthy of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. We reiterate that the Supreme Court in 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l (1968) expressly reserved the 
question of what minimum intrusion is necessary to consti-
tute a seizure. 
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitu-
tional propriety of an investigative "~eizure" upon 
less than probable cause for purposes of "detention" 
and/or interrogation. Obviously, not all personal 
intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"seizures" of persons. Only when the officer, by 
means of physical force or show or authority, has 
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen 
may we conclude that a seizure has occurred. 392 
U.S. 1, 19, n. 16. 
To say that the conduct of the three officers in-
valved was not sufficient show of authority to in some 
way restrain the liberty of the Appellants is to ignore 
the dynamics of the situation. This is not the case of 
a pedestrian policeman stopping a bypasser for identifi-
cation. The Appellants were the only ones in the laundro-
mat. The police action was directed exclusively at them. 
The entrance of Officer Geslison was followed almost im-
mediately by the arrival of two more cars with two more 
officers--a total of three patrolmen arriving separately 
within two minutes. (R.159: 19; 168: 19-20; 182: 17) 
That would seem to be a considerably greater show of 
authority than is ordinarily necessary to check I.D. To 
say that in such a situation one would feel himself free 
to either go or stay as he pleased i~ to ignore reality. 
II. REQUIRING APPELLANTS TO EMPTY THEIR POCKETS 
IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER TERRY AND WAS NOT A 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST 
The Respondent contends that the search of the 
Appellants' persons in the laundromat by Officer Geslison 
was incident to a lawful arrest and therefore justified. 
Respondent's assertion that Appellant Whittenback had 
been arrested by Officer Mock prior to his being searched 
is based on a selective reading of the record and not 
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supported by the weight of the testimony. 
The Respondent relies on Officer Geslison's testimony 
at the suppression hearing. Geslison testified that though 
the order to "empty your pockets" had been given previous to 
Officer Mack's entrance, Appellant Whittenback had not 
actually begun to do so until after Mack's announcement that 
they were under arrest. (R. 149) At the preliminary hearing, 
however, Officer Geslison testified: 
Q (Mr. Schumacher): I understood that. You said 
that after all of these items had been collected, 
then Officer Mock arrested him. 
A (Officer Geslison): Okay. What I had stated, Mr. 
Parrett had already emptied his pockets previous 
to that. As I asked Mr. Whittenback about that same 
time as I was moving over to the table, etc., etc. 
at about the same time that Officer Mock came in. 
He could have started to empty his pockets just 
before that, but like I just told you, I--he had 
questioned me and I told him to empty his pockets. 
Officer Mock, who presumably would be in a better posi-
tion to recall the exact sequence of his entrance and Appellant 
Whittenback's emptying his pockets, testified that Whittenback 
was in the process of carrying out the order when he came in: 
Q (Mr. Schumacher): Did you hear Officer Geslison tell 
him to empty his pockets? 
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A (Officer Mock): No, I did not. 
Q Was he emptying his pockets as you came in? 
A Yes. (R. 185) 
The Terrz case as well as subsequent decisions made 
it clear that any search conducted as a part of a Terry 
stop must be limited to a procedure reasonably designed 
to discover weapons of assault. 
A search for weapons in the absence of probable 
cause to arrest, however, must, like any other 
search, be strictly circumscribed by the exi-
gencies which justify its initiation. [citation] 
Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary 
for the discovery of weapons which might be used to 
harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistical-
ly be characterized as something less than a "full" 
search, even though it remains a serious intrusion. 
392 u.s. at 25-26 
The officers here never suggested that the Appellants were 
carrying weapons. Nor was there anything in the conduct 
of the Appellants that would give rise to apprehension as 
to their own safety or the safety of others. What's more, 
the general order to "empty your pockets" is hardly the sort 
of "strictly circumscribed" measure the Court intended to all~. 
The case of Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), 
decided the same day as Terry, considered many of the same 
issues presented in the present case. In Sibron, a uniformed 
police officer had been keeping the defendant under continual 
observation over a period of eight hours. During that eight 
hour period the officer saw the defendant converse with six 
or eight persons whom he (the officer) knew from past experi-
ence to be narcotics addicts. The defendant then entered 
-4-
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a restaurant where he spoke with three more known addicts. 
The patrolman entered the restaurant and told the defendant 
to come outside. Once outside, the officer said to Sibron, 
"You know what I am after." The defendant mumbled something 
and reached into his pocket whereupon the officer thrust 
his hand into the same pocket discovering several glassine 
envelopes of heroin. The Court said that the action taken 
by the police was illegal under the Fourth Amendment and 
reversed the conviction. 
In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, 
he [the officer) must be able to point to particular 
facts from which he reasonably inferred that the 
individual was armed and dangerous .... 392 at 64. 
Even assuming arguendo that there were adequate grounds 
to search Sibron for weapons, the nature and scope of 
the search conducted by Patrolman Martin was so clear-
ly unrelated to that justification as to render the 
heroin inadmissible. The search for weapons approved 
in Terry consisted solely of patting the outer cloth-
ing of the suspect for concealed objects which might 
be used as instruments of assault. 392 at 65. 
The search of the Appellants' persons was made prior 
to the time they were placed under arrest. There was no 
authorization for the search under Terry since there was 
no indication the Appellants were armed. In any case, the 
order to "empty your pockets" was beyond the scope of any-
thing envisioned by Terry. 
The Respondent now asserts that there was probable 
cause for the arrest before the search was begun. A finding 
of probable cause would have to be based on the observation 
of the two doing laundry late at night in an all-night 
laundromat that was open for business; that one of them 
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had bulging pockets and that two keys were lying on the 
floor; no machines appeared broken into; no alarms had 
sounded; no report had been made to police of machines 
being entered. All that appeared to the officers were 
persons suspected (not convicted) in the past of machine 
break-ins. Appellant contends that such a scanty combi-
nation of facts does not meet the necessary minimum of 
probable cause. 
III. THE SEARCH OF THE AUTOMOBILE WAS A VIOLATION 
OF APPELLANTS' FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
The Respondent next contends that Appellant did not have 
standing under Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) to 
challenge the search of the automobile. In Rakas, a 
petitioner who was merely riding as a passenger in a car 
owned by another and claimed no interest in either the search· 
ed auto or the property seized was held to have no standing 
to make a Fourth Amendment challenge. The Court rejected 
the petitioner's suggestion that any time a search is 
directed at a particular individual he has standing to chal-
lenge its legality. Instead the Court said the inquiry 
should focus on the substantive question of whether there 
has been a violation of the individual's reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
The Appellants clearly had standing under pre-~ 
rules in that they claimed an interest in the goods seized. 
Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 389 (1968). The holding in~ 
does not alter that result. 
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The facts in the present case are similar to the case 
of Jones v. U.S. ,362 U.S. 257 (1960) which the Court in 
Rakas expressly reaffirmed. In Jones the defendant was at 
the time of the search the temporary but sole occupant of 
an apartment owned by a friend. The Court in Rakas said 
that the status gave him a reasonable expectation of 
privacy as to the apartment. Here the Appellants had 
temporary but exclusive use of an automobile owned by 
another. By contrast, the defendants in Rakas were merely 
passengers in the car driven by the owner. The Court 
seemed to indicate that even they would have had standinng 
had they claimed an interest in the property seized. 439 
U.S. at 142 n. 11. It seems clear that the Appellants had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the car. 
Respondents argument, if carried not much further, 
would give a lessor of a car no standing to challenge the 
search of his property in that car owned by another. 
The Respondent argues that it was not necessary for 
the police to secure a warrant to search the car because 
of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
The Supreme Court cases of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 43 
(1970) and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) 
make it clear that what is commonly denominated the auto-
mobile exception is simply an example of an exigent cir-
cumstance that makes the securing of a warrant impracticable. 
The Court said in Coolidge, quoting in part from Chambers, 
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that "exigent circumstances justify the warrantless search 
of 'an automobile stopped on the hiohway, where there is 
probable cause, because the car is movable, the occupants 
are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found 
again if a warrant must be obtained.' ... The word 'auto-
mobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth 
Amendment disappears." [Emphasis original] 
Federal Appeals Courts' decisions make clear the 
necessity of exigent circumstances to justify the warrant-
less search of an automobile. In the case of Harless v. 
Turner, 456 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1972) the Court held the 
warrantless search of a parked rape suspect's car invalid. 
Coolidge makes it clear that the warrantless search 
is the exception rather than the rule and that 
these exceptions are jealously guarded. Further-
more, it is said in Coolidge that the burden is on 
those seeking exemption to show the need for it. 
465 F.2d 1338. 
One situation the Courts have frequently recognized 
as not constituting an exigency that would allow the police 
to dispense with the securing of a warrant is the situation 
where the driver of the searched car is under arrest. In 
U.S. v. McCormick 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974) the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals said in a case similar to this one, 
Six officers entered the house to arrest McCormick, 
and he was quickly handcuffed. Moreover, even if 
he could have gained access to his car, he could 
not have driven it away, because a police car was 
blocking the driveway. In Carroll and Coolidge 
terms, this automobile more resembled a house tnan 
a moving or mobile vehicle. Becau~e there were no 
exigent circumstances at the time of the seizure, the 
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later search cannot be justified under Chambers v. 
Maroney. "No amount of probable cause can justify 
a warrantless search or seizure absent 'exigent 
circumstances,'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. at 468, 91 S.Ct. at 2039, and so the seizure 
here does not fall within the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement. 502 F.2d at 287. 
Likewise with the present case. The second sine qua non 
of the automobile exception was lacking; i.e. there were 
no exigent circumstances. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
L~~~~~~-
Attorney for Appellant 
John Joseph Parrett 
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